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ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF A HYBRID WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Владислава Савчук, Олена Наумчак, Святослав Цимбалюк. АНАЛІЗ ФАЗ РОЗВИТКУ ГІБРИДНОЇ ВІЙНИ В РОЗРІЗІ ПСИХОЛОГІЧНИХ ОПЕРАЦІЙ. У статті систематизовано відомі методи та способи психологічних впливів (ПсВ) на попередніх та теперішньому етапах конфлікту на сході України, основним інструментом яких виступають соціальні інтернет-ресурси та засоби масової інформації (ЗМІ). Розглянуто фази розвитку ПсВ у районі антитерористичної операції (АТО) та Операції об'єднаних сил (ООС) на території Донецької та Луганської областей, основні напрямки здійснення ПсВ на різних етапах конфлікту, цільові аудиторії (ЦА), на які здійснювався вплив, наративи, які були використані для здійснення ПсВ, та використання ключових лідерів різних рівнів, через яких здійснювався ПсВ. Здійснено порівняння специфік здійснення ПсВ на різних етапах конфлікту на сході України та проведено аналогії з іншими військовими конфліктами, які відбулися на різних етапах історії.

Зроблено висновок, що інформаційна боротьба проводиться не тільки в ході військового конфлікту, але й ще задовго до його початку, що й відбулося в ході конфлікту в Україні. На етапі підготовки до збройної боротьби ПсВ проводиться для створення бажаних воєнно-політичних та економічних умов для початку агресії. Основним завданням на сьогодні є вміле застосування практики сучасних війн та локальних конфліктів, ефективне використання на їх прикладі підрозділів ПсО.

Ключові слова: інформаційна війна, цільова аудиторія, методи, засоби, психологічні впливи, антитерористична операція, Операція Об'єднаних сил.

Relevance of the study. At the present stage of development of society, the importance of non-force methods of influencing on the course of political, economic and social processes in states is rapidly growing. The main trend in the development of society is the transition to a new form of war – information war (IW). The security of our state in this area is an important issue, especially in the context of the conflict in the east of Ukraine.

Recent publications review. Many research works are devoted to the influence on the mass and individual consciousness [1–8]. Considerable attention is paid to the creation of countermeasures against psychological operations (PSO) [8]. In the scientific research of many researchers, the mechanisms of introducing IW have been deeply analyzed. For example, in [1] methods of psychological influences in the ATO region are presented, implemented only in the media [9], focused on the analysis of propaganda tools. However, the duration and multifaceted nature of the conflict determines the relevance of the analysis. The forms, methods, technologies and means of waging IW, which are fully disclosed using examples of modern experience, on the one hand, and the insufficient number of publications on the analysis of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, make it necessary to analyze the psychological influences, in view of the open IW in during the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

The research paper's objective is to highlight the phases of the development of the conflict and analyze the psychological influences and their means during the ATO and JFO on the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions.

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Discussion. In Ukraine, IW began long before the aggravation of the situation on the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which continues to accompany it at all stages, adapting in advance to current goals and objectives. Russia’s hybrid war strategy targets Ukraine’s weaknesses, not its strengths. Based on [3], it can be argued that the preparation was started long before there were clear signs of Russia’s IW against Ukraine.

The first phase of a hybrid war can be characterized by latent aggression extended over time. It was accompanied by the imposition of the culture of another country in Ukraine, political games and a surge in the spread of psychological influences in the mass media.

The implementation of the main part of IW against Ukraine by the Russian Federation (RF) began in 2013. The beginning of the revival of the information campaign can be defined as discrimination against Ukrainian exports to the Russian Federation on August 14, 2013, which led to economic damage. This influenced on the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union and prompted Ukraine to join the Customs Union [8].

PSO, aimed at all categories of the population and all regions of Ukraine, as well as the population of Russia and Western countries, had different targets and tasks. The main goal of the Russia’s IW against Ukraine at this stage is the elimination of statehood; which is interpreted as the task of obtaining support from Russian population of Ukraine for the leadership of the Russian Federation.

The active implementation of the psychological influences is confirmed by the analysis of publications of the Ukrainian and Russian mass media from August, 2013 to November, 2021 (tables 1-2).

Table 1

Narratives that use Russian information resources

Narratives Mass media	Ukraine is a Nazi country	Ukraine is a semi-state	The role of the Russian Federation in the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine	Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on gas supplies	Zelensky deceived voters	Medvedchuk is the hope of Ukraine	The role of the Russian Federation in armed conflicts in eastern Ukraine	Ukraine is a puppet of the West
	Izvestia (Newspaper)	+	+			+	+	
Komsomolskaya Pravda (Newspaper)		+	+				+	
Kommersant (Newspaper)		+		+	+			+
Russian newspaper (Newspaper)			+	+	+	+		+
First channel (TV)	+	+		+		+	+	
Russia-1 (TV)		+			+			+
NTV (TV)					+	+		+
Russia Today (TV)		+		+	+		+	+
RIA Novosti (Telegram channel)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Table 2

Narratives that use Ukrainian information resources

Narratives Mass media	Russia incites discord	Equating Putin with Stalin and Hitler	Russian peoples live in constant fear	Migrants from the east settle in Russia	Self-proclaimed republics have no future	Russia will not stand up to pressure from the West	Russia is guilty of the deaths of civilians in Donbass	Ukraine and Russia have nothing in common
	1+1 (TV)	+	+		+	+		+
ICTV (TV)	+		+	+	+	+	+	
5 channel (TV)	+	+		+		+	+	+
Censor.net (Internet resource)	+		+	+	+		+	
Obozrevatel ⁷ (Internet resource)	+		+		+	+	+	
Correspondent (Magazine)	+		+	+		+	+	
Express (Newspaper)	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ukraine 24/7 (Telegram channel)	+		+		+	+	+	

The second phase acquires a certain openness, but the aggressor does not finally reveal his intentions. Its feature is the use of irregular armed formations. This step can be characterized by the transition to the introduction of armed struggle on the territory of Ukraine.

Thus, military units without identification marks, commonly known as «little green men», introduced to seize the territory of the Crimea, and later cities in eastern Ukraine, became the basis for the organization of illegal armed formations, the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). The information campaign that accompanied these events tried to hide the military structures under the guise of the Donbass people's militia. An important feature of the Russia's psychological influences in eastern Ukraine at this stage is the use of television and radio broadcasting [9].

A separate direction of psychological influences to the TA, actively used by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, is the spread of rumors. According to the experience of the ATO and JFO, the means of spreading rumors are individual activists, Russian television, broadcasts of local cable operators, as well as information messages published in the press, leaflets [9].

The third phase of the hybrid war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine is characterized by the use of more sophisticated approaches to the conduct of psychological influences, namely the use of modern technical means for the purpose of conducting information operations and PSO. Mobile phones have become the cause of many defeats of the military in the ATO and JFO [11]. It is known that the armed forces of the Russian Federation have electronic warfare devices that can inhibit such GSM networks as the latest mobile technical control complex, electronic imitation and jamming of electronic equipment Leer-2.

A feature of this stage is the destruction of the equipment of Ukrainian mobile operators, probably to induce the transition of the local population to the services of a «republican» operator. Thus, the equipment of the Ukrainian mobile operator MTS (Vodafone) was dismantled on the territory of the «Novoazovskiy compound feed plant». In the temporarily occupied territory of the Luhansk region, a multi-fiber cable has been laid from the Russian Federation, all Internet traffic to the territory of the republic is actually provided by Rostelecom through the Luga.com provider.

Other regional providers will gradually be squeezed out of the telecommunications market. During the annexation of the Crimea, special forces units of the RF Armed Forces disabled or took control of the fixed communication units of the private joint-stock company Ukrtelecom, so the only means for exchanging information was, for the most part, the cellular mobile network. Taking into account the kinship of the Ukrainian and Russian languages, the Russian military with the latest means of electronic intelligence could control all cellular communication channels in the territory of the Crimea and intercept, including negotiations

between officials of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which was briefly told by the Commander of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2014-2016 Sergei Gaiduk [12].

At this stage of the spread of destructive psychological influences through the mass media, many manipulative technologies are being implemented. For example, the introduction of mediators – “thought leaders” – is one of the more used techniques of the Russian media [13]. As mediators of a social group, depending on the situation, are informal leaders, politicians, representatives of religious confessions, cultural workers, scientists, art workers, athletes, and the military. For each category of the population, its own authority is elected. “Lukashenko considers the Crimea is a part of Russia”, “Leader of the French National Front Marine Le Pen said that she recognized the referendum in the Crimea as quite legal”, “Kusturica about the Maidan: Western politicians are better directors than me”, “Representatives of the Romanovs consider the return of Crimea to Russia to be an indisputable historical justice”.

Russian subdivisions of information and psychological operations have already actively used their capabilities in the field of IW [11; 13], at a time when the Ukrainian divisions of PSO were not yet ready to adequately counter the psychological influences [14]. The lack of experience in conducting PSO and countering them by PSO units in the Armed Forces of Ukraine led to the transition to the *fourth phase* of IW against Ukraine, which is accompanied by the creation of PSO units, whose actions are aimed at the conflict zone.

The main means for the implementation of the psychological influences of the PSO units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are: means of the Internet; VHF radio broadcasting through local radio stations; 122 mm propaganda shells; sound broadcasting stations ZS-88; printing (postcards and printed materials); carrying out such psychological actions as performances in front of the collectives of enterprises and factories; participation in public events; appearances in local media; participation in humanitarian actions is actively used by both the Russian and Ukrainian sides as the most effective means of influence.

The main drawback of the activities of the PSO units is the imperfection of the structures for maintaining IW at the state level, which means the absence of a unified management structure for the PSO units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Therefore, the *fifth phase* of the deployment of the conflict in the east of Ukraine was the creation of a separate type of troops.

In 2015, in Ukraine, the creation of units of the PSO of the Special Operations Forces began. According to the regulatory documents in the direction of information and psychological counteraction in the ATO, they use tools that monitor open sources of information, social networks, implement psychological influences in social networks for certain objects, tools for the development of posters, leaflets and radio programs with targeted content [15].

In IW, a special role is assigned to the use of the civilian population for mass resistance to the legitimate government. The killing of foreign soldiers ceases to be the main goal – in IW it is enough to provide the necessary information support. Analyzing the experience of ATO and JFO, it is possible to single out the main methods of psychological influences, which the Russian Federation uses against Ukraine (Table 3).

The sixth phase is the full assimilation of the NATO experience. In 2016, guidance documents were developed for PSO units, such as documents from NATO member countries. At the end of 2016, the Interim Guidelines for Psychological Operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were approved [16], and subsequently, the Guidelines for Psychological Operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces were developed and approved, which are still used today.

In the framework of psychological actions, the possibilities of social networks are widely used as a means for psychological influences. Information technologies for automation of Internet monitoring in the interests of PSO units are being developed. The intensification of the use of new information technologies is intensifying in all areas of IW. For example, the Armed Forces of Ukraine replaced obsolete VHF stations with new ones from Motorola, and in 2017 signed a contract with Asselsan [18]. The structure of modernization of ATGMs was proposed [17]. Scientific units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are constantly developing new technologies, automating the processes of creating products of psychological influences with the means of propaganda, etc. [18].

Ukrainian Armed Forces PSO units actively share experiences with NATO partners. In 2018, an agreement was announced to intensify activities for the development of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces [19].

As of October 2021, the Armed Forces has two units ready for NATO Response Force, namely: 140 SOF Center (from 2020) and a separate Special Operations Center «East» (from 2021) [20].

**The main methods of psychological influences
that the Russian Federation uses against Ukraine**

<i>Means used</i>	<i>Method of psychological influences against Ukraine</i>
TV, radio	Widespread use of controlled media, propaganda and creation of the necessary favorable information and psychological background in Ukraine, in particular for misinformation, escalation of the situation, justification of aggression, demoralization of patriotic circles of Ukrainian society.
Means of electronic warfare	Counter-information struggle, exclusion from the radio space in the territories controlled by the Russian Federation of national Ukrainian TV and radio channels, suppression of GSM-networks.
Internet	Use of the propaganda units in information and social networks (forums, social groups, Internet communities), prompt distribution of video from the scene via the Internet and social networks. A number of new Internet channels (for example, «Anna News») have been launched on the territory of DPR and LPR.
Personal mobile phones, tablets, cameras	Videos in the area of environmental protection are received both from full-time operators and correspondents of TV channels, and from participants of events. Shooting «fake» videos with elements of staging and half-truths.
Mass media	Videos in the area of environmental protection are received both from full-time operators and correspondents of TV channels, and from participants of events. Shooting «fake» videos with elements of staging and half-truths.

At present, in order to constantly distract the population from the existing socio-economic problems, the media under the control of the occupation authorities of the DPR and LPR continue to work actively to discredit the ATO and JFO forces and the top military and political leadership of Ukraine. The spread of psychological influences aimed at reducing the moral and psychological condition of Ukrainian servicemen continues. The authorities of the self-proclaimed republics are trying to form an opinion about the possibility of complicating the security situation, as well as to emphasize the «positive role» of the Russian military [18].

Conclusions. The information struggle is taking place not only during the military conflict, but also long before it began, as happened during the conflict in Ukraine. At the stage of preparation for armed struggle, psychological influences are conducted to create the desired military-political and economic conditions for the beginning of aggression. The main task today is the skillful application of the practice of modern wars and local conflicts, the effective use of PSO units on their example.

A promising area may be to assess their own capabilities and identify shortcomings, to further eliminate them. It is expedient to determine the methods and techniques of IW management that are the most effective, and to develop on their basis the concept of counteracting destructive foreign psychological influences. In the future, it is planned to develop methods of dissemination of psychological influences through mass media.

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ABSTRACT

The known methods of psychological influences at the previous and current stages of the conflict in the east of Ukraine, the main tools of which are social Internet resources and the mass media are systematized in the article. The phases of the development of the psychological influences in the area of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) and the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the main directions of the psychological influences implemented at different stages of the conflict, the target audiences (TA) that were under the influence, the narratives that were used for implementation of the psychological influences at different levels through which the psychological influences was carried out. Comparisons are made of the specifics of the implementation of the psychological influences at different stages of the conflict in the east of Ukraine and analogies are drawn with other military conflicts that occurred at different stages of history.

Keywords: *information war, target audience, methods, means, psychological influences, anti-terrorist operation, joint forces operation.*

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КЛАСИФІКАЦІЯ ПОНЯТТЯ АКТ ОФІЦІЙНОГО ТЛУМАЧЕННЯ НОРМ ПРАВА: АНАЛІЗ ІСНУЮЧИХ ТА НОВІ ПІДХОДИ

Розглянуто існуючі в сучасній юридичній науці підходи до класифікації поняття акт офіційного тлумачення норм права. На основі їх аналізу уточнено підстави для видової диференціації формально-обов'язкового волевиявлення органів публічної влади (їх посадових і службових осіб), що здійснює інформаційний вплив на свідомість право-дієздатних суб'єктів права шляхом роз'яснення змісту норм права і приписів ненормативного характеру або окремих їх фрагментів, а також обґрунтовано ряд нових підходів до поділу категорії акт офіційного тлумачення норм права на основі таких критеріїв: 1) за онтологічним статусом акта тлумачення норм права у національній правовій системі; 2) залежно від того, наскільки правильно (адекватно) відображена в інтерпретаційному акті воля суб'єкта правотворчості; 3) залежно від ролі інтерпретаційно-правових актів у розвитку юридичних колізій; 4) за способом зв'язку акта тлумачення норм права з правовою дійсністю.

Ключові слова: *категорія акт офіційного тлумачення норм права (інтерпретаційно-правовий акт), критерії (підстави) для видової диференціації, класифікація поняття акт офіційного тлумачення норм права, видова диференціація актів тлумачення норм права, вид інтерпретаційно-правового акта.*

Постановка проблеми. Нагальна потреба пізнання акта тлумачення норм права як самостійного явища правової дійсності в усій багатоманітності його проявів, вимагає розробки науково обґрунтованих підходів до класифікації однойменної загальнотеоретичної категорії. На цій проблемі акцентував увагу у свій час академік Ю. Годика. Вчений, зокрема, відзначав, що правова природа, види та вимоги до актів тлумачення права в українській юридичній літературі серйозно не досліджувались, а необхідність у цьому є, і до того ж досить велика [13, с. 89].

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